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Abstract: Autonomic computing has been recognized as a valid approach to the development of large-scale self-
managing complex systems. The Autonomic System Specification Language (ASSL) is an initiative for the 
development of autonomic systems where we approach the problem of formal specification, validation, and 
code generation of such systems within a framework. As part of our research on ASSL, we have developed 
and investigated different approaches to software verification. Currently, the latter is possible via built -in 
consistency checking and functional testing where handling logical errors is a daunting task.  In this paper, 
we discuss our work on model checking with NASA’s Java PathFinder tool, which is an explicit-state model 
checker that works directly on the generated Java code. We propose optional automatic generation of test 
drivers in the form of PathFinder API calls seeded in the ASSL-generated code. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays software permeates everywhere where 
information technology can be useful to some 
extent. However, contemporary software faces the 
expanding burden of complexity in software 
development and of ensuring both its correctness 
and reliability. Hence, initiatives such as autonomic 
computing (Parashar and Hariri, 2006) have risen to 
introduce theories and techniques intended to reduce 
the complexity of managing systems through 
automation. Moreover a great deal of research effort 
is devoted to developing software verification 
methods. A promising, and lately popular, technique 
for software verification is model checking (Clarke, 
Grumberg and Peled, 2002; Baier and Katoen, 
2008). 
The vision and metaphor of autonomic 
computing (AC) (Murch, 2004) is to apply the 
principles of self-regulation and complexity hiding 
to the design of complex computer-based systems.  
However, the very complexity of many systems that 
lend themselves well to AC can often imply 
difficulty in designing the autonomic system itself. 
 
 
The ASSL Approach to AC. The Autonomic 
System Specification Language (ASSL) (Vassev, 
2008) is a framework dedicated to AC. By providing 
a powerful formal notation and computational tools, 
ASSL helps AC researchers with problem formation, 
system design, system analysis and evaluation, and 
system implementation. The framework’s tools 
allow ASSL specifications to be edited and 
validated. The current validation approach in ASSL 
is a form of consistency checking performed against 
a set of semantic definitions (Vassev, 2008). The 
latter form a theory that aids in the construction of 
correct autonomic system (AS) specifications. In 
addition, from any valid specification, ASSL can 
generate an operational Java application skeleton.  
As part of the framework validation and in the 
course of a new ongoing research project at Lero — 
the Irish Software Engineering Research Centre, 
ASSL has been successfully used to specify 
autonomic properties and generate prototype models 
of the NASA ANTS concept mission (Vassev, 
Hinchey and Paquet, 2008) and the NASA Voyager 
mission (Vassev and Hinchey, 2009). 
 1.1 Research Problem and Proposed 
Solution 
ASSL provides automatic code generation, which 
ensures consistency between a specification and its 
implementation. However, our experience with 
ASSL has demonstrated that errors can be easily 
introduced while specifying large systems. Although 
the ASSL framework takes care of syntax and 
consistency errors, it still cannot handle logical 
errors. 
We are currently working on this, and 
investigating a few possible approaches to ensure the 
correctness of the ASSL specifications, and that of 
the generated autonomic systems: 
 We are working on improving the current 
ASSL consistency checker with assertion and 
debugging techniques, which should allow for 
a good deal of static analysis of an ASSL 
specification. This approach will improve the 
verification process, but will not be sufficient 
to assert safety (e.g., freedom from deadlock) 
or liveness properties. 
 We are investigating model checking as the 
most effective approach to software 
verification for our purposes.  
 
Model checking is a formal methods technique that 
allows formal specifications to be tested 
exhaustively (Clarke, Grumberg and Peled, 2002; 
Baier and Katoen, 2008). The approach advocates 
formal verification tools whereby the formal 
specifications are automatically checked for specific 
flaws by considering special correctness properties 
expressed in temporal logic (Baier and Katoen, 
2008). 
In the course of this long-term project, we 
consider three different possible approaches to 
model checking. 
 A part of this research is on a model-checking 
mechanism that takes an ASSL specification 
as input and produces as output a finite state-
transition system (also called a state graph) 
such that a specific property in question is 
satisfied if and only if the original ASSL 
specification satisfies that property (Vassev, 
Hinchey and Quigley, 2009). 
 Another research direction is towards mapping 
ASSL specifications to special service logic 
graphs, which support the so-called reverse 
model checking (Bakera et al., 2009). 
 In this paper we present our third approach to 
model checking with ASSL. The latter 
generates operational Java code, which we use 
to perform a sort of post-implementation 
model checking with the Java PathFinder tool 
developed at NASA Ames (Visser et al., 
2000). In this approach, we use Java 
PathFinder to verify the generated Java code. 
We are at the beginning of our research and 
the results presented here are preliminary. 
1.2 Why Post-Implementation Model 
Checking? 
Although it is widely accepted that model checking 
should be applied to the design phase rather than to 
the implementation phase of the software lifecycle, 
we believe that post-implementation model checking 
is worthy of investigation and probably well 
integrated with ASSL.  
In (Vassev, Hinchey, Quigley, 2009) we reveal 
the so-called state-explosion problem we are 
currently facing with specification-phase model 
checking. Due to the highly concurrent nature of the 
ASSL-specified ASs, the size of an ASSL state 
graph is at least exponential in the number of 
running ASs internal concurrent processes. This is 
because the state space of the entire AS is built as 
the Cartesian product of the local state of these 
concurrent processes. Here, our possible solutions to 
the state-explosion problem are abstraction 
techniques that reduce the number of states to be 
tested; i.e., the model checking mechanism does not 
explore all the possible paths of execution, but only 
those considered important. However, this approach 
makes it possible to generate ASs with ASSL that 
contain fatal errors (e.g., deadlocks), which cannot 
be detected, despite careful specification and the 
existence of model checking. 
Another good reason for having post-
implementation model checking is the possibility to 
verify not only the newly-generated code but also all 
consecutively updated versions of the same. Thus, 
we can check the code even if it has evolved 
following its automatic generation with ASSL. 
 
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related 
work on post-implementation model checking. As a 
background to the remaining sections, Section 3 
provides a brief description of the ASSL framework 
and the built-in consistency checking mechanism. 
Section 4 introduces Java PathFinder and the 
proposed post-implementation approach to model 
checking by integrating that tool in ASSL. Finally, 
Section 5 presents concluding remarks and future 
work.   
 2 RELATED WORK 
In the course of this research, we found two 
interesting projects targeting post-implementation 
model checking, where the implementation language 
is C. 
In (Ball, T., Podelski. A., Rajamani, S., 2001) 
the SLAM project at Microsoft is described. This 
project is similar to Java PathFinder in the sense that 
it also relies on different techniques to accomplish 
model checking. SLAM uses techniques such as 
static analysis, abstraction, and symbolic model 
checking (Clarke, Grumberg and Peled, 2002; Baier 
and Katoen, 2008). A special model checker for 
Boolean programs (Ball and Rajamani, 2000) is used 
where all the program variables are of the Boolean 
type. The idea is to apply abstraction on the original 
C program by extracting a state graph and then to 
check whether program statements are reachable. 
For any reachable statement, the path of instructions 
to that statement is symbolically executed on the 
original program. If the executed path does not 
match the expected path, a Boolean variable is 
created to catch the point where the difference 
begins. Further, the same process is repeated with a 
new Boolean condition (involving the newly created 
Boolean variable) that removes the path difference.  
Another post-implementation model checker is 
the FeaVer tool (Holzmann and Smith, 2000). The 
latter is based on the SPIN (Ben-Ari, 2008) model 
checker mechanism. FeaVer extracts an abstract 
verification model in PROMELA (Iosif, 1998) (a 
special verification modeling language) from the C 
program, and verifies it against special logic 
properties. The process of abstraction is semi-
automated because a special lookup table is used to 
translate C code to PROMELA code. Once the 
verification model is created, in a series of steps a 
complete verification of the model is performed with 
the construction of increasingly detailed PROMELA 
models. The SPIN model checker is used to perform 
model checking on the PROMELA models. 
3 ASSL 
In general, ASSL considers ASs as composed of 
autonomic elements (AEs) interacting over 
interaction protocols. To specify ASs, ASSL uses a 
multi-tier specification model (Vassev, 2008). By 
their nature, the ASSL tiers are abstractions of 
different aspects of the AS under consideration, such 
as self-management policies, communication 
interfaces, execution semantics, actions, etc. There 
are three major tiers (abstraction perspectives), each 
composed of sub-tiers (cf. Figure 1): 
 AS tier — forms a general and global AS 
perspective, where we define the general 
system rules in terms of service-level 
objectives (SLO) and self-management 
policies, architecture topology, and global 
actions, events, and metrics applied in these 
rules. Note that ASSL express policies with 
special states called fluents (Vassev, 2008).  
 AS Interaction Protocol (ASIP) tier — forms a 
perspective that defines the means of 
communication between AEs.  
 AE tier — forms a unit-level perspective, 
where we define interacting sets of individual 




Figure 1: ASSL multi-tier specification model. 
AEs are intelligent agents and the ASSL-developed 
ASs are considered multi-agent systems. Similar to 
any multi-agent system (Sycara, 1998), AEs are 
autonomous entities that interact either cooperatively 
or non-cooperatively (on a selfish base). The 
interaction though in the ASSL approach is going 
over predefined messages. In addition, the ASSL-
developed AEs provide the needed decision-making 
capability that underlies autonomy and self-
management. Moreover, ASSL allows for defining 
the architecture topology of an AS where AEs can 
be grouped into groups forming bigger intelligent 
 entities (mini ASs). Here, the group formation can 
be centralized or GRID-alike (Vassev, 2008). 
3.1 Consistency Checking in ASSL 
In general, we can group the ASSL tiers into groups 
of declarative (or imperative) and operational tiers. 
Whereas the former simply describe definitions in 
the AS under consideration, the latter not only 
describe definitions but also focus on the operational 
behavior of that AS. The ASSL framework evaluates 
an AS specification formally to construct a special 
declarative specification tree needed to perform 
both consistency checking and code generation. 
Consistency checking (cf. Figure 2) is a 
framework mechanism for verifying specifications 
by performing exhaustive traversal of the declarative 
specification tree. In general, the framework 
performs two kinds of consistency-checking 
operations: 1) light – checks for type consistency, 
ambiguous definitions, etc.; and 2) heavy – checks 
whether the specification model conforms to special 







Figure 2: Consistency checking with ASSL. 
The correctness properties are ASSL semantic 
definitions defined per tier (Vassev, 2008). 
Although, these are expressed in First-Order Linear 
Temporal Logic (FOLTL) (Baier and Katoen, 2008), 
currently, ASSL does not incorporate a FOLTL 
engine, and thus, the consistency checking 
mechanism implements the correctness properties as 
Java statements. Here, the FOLTL operators ∀ 
(forall) and ∃ (exists) work over sets of ASSL tier 
instances. In addition, these operators are translated 
by taking their first argument as a logical atom that 
contains a single unbound tier variable. Ideally, this 
atom has a relatively small number of ground tier 
instances, so the combinatorial explosion generally 
produced by these statements is controlled. 
It is important to mention that the consistency 
checking mechanism generates consistency errors or 
warnings. Warnings are specific situations, where 
the specification does not contradict the correctness 
properties, but rather introduces uncertainty as to 
how the code generator will handle it. Although 
considered efficient, the ASSL consistency checking 
mechanism has some major drawbacks: 
 It does not consider the notion of time, and 
thus, temporal FOLTL operators such as 
always, next, eventually, until, waiting-for, 
etc., are omitted. Therefore, ASSL consistency 
checking is not able to assert safety (e.g., 
freedom from deadlock) or liveness properties 
(e.g., a message sent is eventually received). 
 The interpretation of the FOLTL formulas into 
Java statements is done in an analytical way 
and thus the introduction of errors is possible. 
 There is no easy way to add new correctness 




In this section, we present our preliminary work on 
model checking with ASSL and Java PathFinder. As 
we have already stated, we are at the beginning of 
our research on this model checking approach. Thus, 
the results presented here are rather theoretical. 
4.1 Java PathFinder 
Java PathFinder is a post-implementation model 
checker tool written in Java and targeting at Java 
programs (Visser et al., 2000; Java PathFinder, 
2008). It can check Java programs for deadlocks, 
invariants and user-defined assertions in the code. 
Moreover, properties expressed in Linear Temporal 
Logic (Baier and Katoen, 2008) can be checked.  
In general, it is claimed that Java PathFinder is 
capable of checking any Java program that does not 
rely on native methods. However, it is important to 
mention that the state-explosion problem limits the 
size of the applications that can be checked 
effectively up to 10,000 lines of code (Java 
PathFinder, 2008).Similar to any regular model 
checking tool, Java PathFinder performs exhaustive 
testing. The difference is that it works on the real 
Java code instead of on a state graph. Here, the basic 
technique is multiple execution of the program under 
consideration to check all the possible executions for 
paths that can lead to property violations, such as 
deadlocks or unhandled exceptions. If an error is 
found, Java PathFinder reports the execution path 
that leads to it. Note that every execution step is 
recorded, so we can trace the execution path that 
gets to property violation.  
Figure 3 depicts the operational model of Java 
PathFinder. As depicted, different components 
(tools) work by accompanying the execution of the 
compiled Java program (in Java bytecode), e.g., an 
ASSL-generated AS compiled to Java bytecode with 























Figure 3: Java PathFinder operational model (elaborated from Java PathFinder, 2008) 
As shown by Figure 3, special configurable search 
strategies are provided to solve the problem of state 
explosion. Because for large (more than 10,000 lines 
of code) applications the whole state space cannot be 
searched effectively, these search strategies are used 
to direct the search. 
In addition, different state-reduction techniques 
can help to reduce the number of states that have to 
be stored:   
 Special heuristic choice generators are 
provided to set possible choices where a 
certain state does not have to be complete. 
These generators have the form of Java 
PathFinder APIs that can be embedded in the 
tested applications. 
 A special library abstraction per state reduces 
the overhead coming from tracking the run-
time data changes taking place in the checked 
Java application. Note that all the heap, stack, 
and thread changes are stored by default. This 
can cause a big overhead if abstraction is not 
provided.    
4.2 Embedding Java PathFinder in 
ASSL 
In general, Java PathFinder provides capabilities for 
non-deterministic testing via random input data 
generators (Java PathFinder, 2008) that can be 
embedded in the tested Java application. Special 
APIs are provided, which can significantly ease the 
creation of test drivers.  
Hence, the ASSL framework can automatically 
generate such test drivers based on the Java 
PathFinder API. ASSL could generate these special 
test drives as non-deterministic choices implemented 
in the generated code. Here, to simulate non-
deterministic testing we rely on two Java PathFinder 
capabilities – backtracking and state matching.     
With backtracking, we use the Java PathFinder 
tool to restore previous execution states, which helps 
to determine whether there are unexplored choices 
left. Therefore, if an end state is reached, backward 
steps can be performed to find execution paths that 
are still not executed, and thus, the program does not 
have to be re-executed from the very beginning.  
With state matching, the Java PathFinder checks 
whether a specific execution path has already been 
explored any time when an ASSL-generated non-
deterministic choice is reached. In such a case, 
model checking does not continue along the current 
execution path, but does backtracking to reach the 
nearest non-explored path that starts from the 
nearest non-deterministic choice. For example, the 
following run() method could be generated by the 
ASSL framework for an autonomic element.  
 
public class AE_WORKER { 
 ... 
 public void run () { 
  boolean cond = Verify.getBoolean(); 
  if (cond) { ... } 





Note that autonomic elements are generated by 
ASSL as Java Threads (Vassev, 2008). Here, a non-
deterministic PathFinder choice point will be 
generated (cf. cond = Verify.getBoolean) 
to test two different paths of execution of the 
autonomic element.Both backtracking and state 
matching techniques will be used to trace the two 
possible execution path – when cond = true and 
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 5 CONCLUSION 
A model checking mechanism will complete the 
ASSL framework by allowing for automated system 
analysis and evaluation of any ASSL-generated 
autonomic system, and thus, it will help to validate 
liveness and safety properties of the same. 
As a part of our long-term research on model 
checking with ASSL, we are currently investigating 
post-implementation model checking with NASA’s 
Java PathFinder tool. In this paper, we have justified 
and presented our approach to applying Java 
PathFinder on ASSL-generated autonomic systems. 
We propose automatic generation of special 
PathFinder choice points in the generated Java 
applications. These choice points, together with the 
provided backtracking and state matching 
PathFinder mechanisms, will allow for possibly 
efficient post-implementation model checking. 
Future research is concerned with further 
development of this approach and experimental 
results. Moreover, it is our intention to build an 
animation tool for ASSL, which will help to 
visualize counterexamples and trace erroneous 
execution paths. It is our belief that a model 
checking mechanism for ASSL will enable broad-
scale formal verification of ASs. Therefore, it will 
make ASSL a better and more powerful framework 
for AS specification, validation and code generation.  
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